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In the environmental economics literature the standard approach of modeling nonlinear 
production and abatement processes is to treat waste emissions "simply as another factor of 
production" (Cropper and Oates 1992). That approach doesn't map the materials flow 
involved completely and hides, moreover, the exact links between production, residuals 
generation and abatement. This paper shows that production functions with emissions treated 
as inputs can be reconstructed as a subsystem of a comprehensive production-cum-abatement 
technology that is in line with the materials-balance principle. In a simple economy with full 
regard of the materials flow it also explores the consequences for allocative efficiency and 
efficiency-restoring taxation of multiple and interdependent residuals generated in the 
transformation processes of production, abatement and consumption. Finally, the paper 
demonstrates that efficiency may require setting the emissions tax rate above or below 
conventionally defined marginal abatement cost if the residual subject to abatement is not the 
only residual causing pollution. 
JEL Code: Q50, Q52. 
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 Nonlinear production, abatement, pollution 
and materials balance reconsidered 
1 
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1. The problem 
As is well-known from the law of mass conservation, the flow of materials taken from the 
environment for economic uses generates a flow of materials from the economy back into the 
environment that is of equal weight (after accounting for time delays). The economic activi-
ties of production and consumption are merely processes of transforming materials that only 
change the physical and chemical attributes and the composition of the materials flow. Quite 
obviously, the composition of the flow of residuals from the economy into the environment is 
of great significance because different kinds of residuals differ in their detrimental impact on 
the environment.
2 
As a consequence, a sensible strategy for alleviating the problem of environmental degrada-
tion is to control the process of materials transformation by reducing the emission of the most 
harmful pollutants through residuals abatement activities. Like production and consumption, 
this activity is a process of transforming materials subject to the materials-balance principle: 
the weight of all material outputs of that process equals the weight of all material inputs. 
In their seminal paper on 'production, consumption and externalities', Ayres and Kneese 
(1969) made a strong case for the need of a consistent and encompassing application of the 
materials-balance principle to all transformation processes. In their formalized materials-
balance approach they employed linear technologies with fixed input-output coefficients but 
since then the profession has revealed a preference for modeling non-linear rather than linear 
technologies. In fact, the notion and empirical evidence of strictly increasing (real) marginal 
abatement costs is at the core of many pollution control studies. 
To be sure, it is possible to bring non-linear (abatement) technologies into line with materials-
balance requirements, too. This has been demonstrated in various previous studies the most 
general and ambitious of which probably is Krysiak and Krysiak (2003). Yet fully regarding 
the materials-balance principle in theoretical analysis comes at the cost of enormous addi-
                                                 
1 Helpful comments by Thomas Eichner, Reyer Gerlagh and by two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowl-
edged. Remaining errors are the author's sole responsibility. 
2  A more detailed analysis would need to focus on further determinants such as the medium of discharge and the 
local environmental medium's assimilative capacity.   2
tional complexity which tends to prevent the derivation of informative results. To avoid such 
complexities many environmental economists became reluctant to explicitly and properly 
regard the materials-balance principle as the correct theoretical foundation of their analyses 
(Pezzey and Toman 2002, 202; Pethig 2003). Therefore Ayres and Kneese's (1969, 283) ver-
dict still applies to much of the present work that production processes are viewed "… in a 
manner that is somewhat at variance with the law of conservation of mass". 
To be more specific, consider the simple production function 
3 : Y + + → \\  with 
() yY e , , m = A ,                             ( 1 )  
where two inputs, labor  A and material m, are employed to produce two outputs as joint 
products, a wanted consumer good, y, and an unwanted production residual, e (with e for 
emissions). This type of technology was already applied in the early 1970s, e. g. by Forster 
(1972) and Klevorick and Cramer (1972). Varying grossly in its degree of generality, it be-
came a widespread and accepted tool of analysis within few years (e. g. in Mäler 1974, Pethig 
1975, Baumol and Oates 1975). 
In their survey on environmental economics, Cropper and Oates (1992) refer to the production 
function (1) as the standard approach in the environmental economics literature
3. They ob-
serve that the treatment of waste emissions "simply as another factor of production … seems 
reasonable since attempts … to cut back on waste discharge will involve the diversion of 
other inputs to abatement activities - thereby reducing the availability of these other inputs for 
the production of goods" (Cropper and Oates 1992, p. 678). This citation reveals these au-
thors' awareness of technology (1) as a concept that implicitly involves both the generation of 
a production residual and an abatement activity. Cropper and Oates (1992, p. 678) also find it 
reasonable "...to assume the usual curvature properties ..." that is, they require function Y from 
(1) to exhibit the 
Properties (Y):  
3 : Y ++ → \\  is concave and satisfies  0, 0 0 em YYa n d Y >> > A . 
It is not clear, however, what exactly is the link between the production of a consumer good, 
residuals generation and abatement which Cropper and Oates conjecture as being hidden in 
(1). To put it differently, it is not clear how an explicit and comprehensive analysis of interde-
                                                 
3  As compared to our equation (1), the equation (2) in Cropper and Oates (1992, p. 678) is slightly more general 
in that they allow for an arbitrarily large vector of conventional inputs (which is reduced to the two-dimensional 
vector  () ,m A  in (1)) and allow the level of pollution to be a negative productivity-reducing externality. This 
externality is omitted in the present paper to keep the analysis simple.   3
pendent production, residuals generation and abatement would relate to production functions 
of type (1).
4 
The main objectives of the present paper are (i) to undertake a fresh exploration of that issue 
with the important qualification to keep the analysis strictly (and explicitly!) in line with the 
materials-balance principle and (ii) to assess the consequences of (i) for allocative efficiency 
and pollution control. An immediate implication of adopting a rigorous materials-balance 
perspective is to insist that the treatment of emissions in (1) as 'conventional inputs in produc-
tion functions' is only acceptable as a convenient though purely formal analytical device not 
meant to deny the emissions' true nature as unwanted by-products generated in the process of 
producing wanted goods and then discharged into the environment. 
To further clarify this point suppose A and m are constant in (1). Since  e Y , the marginal 
abatement cost in terms of the wanted output, is positive, one can choose from a menu of 
good things, y, and bad things, e, but more of the good inadvertently comes along with more 
of the bad. While this property of (1) serves the needs of model building in environmental 
economics well, (1) is less appealing, if not outright embarrassing, regarding its materials-
balance implications. To see that suppose all units of the outputs y and e as well as all units of 
input m are defined such that each unit is equal to one unit of weight. Suppose further that the 
technology (1) is understood as a process of transforming the material m into the outputs y 
and e. With these qualifications one may wish to know whether (1) can be considered the de-
scription of a transformation process that involves no material inputs other than m and no ma-
terial outputs other than y and e. The answer is an outright and definitive no. (1) would bla-
tantly violate the materials-balance principle, since that principle requires m = e + y if no 
other inputs and outputs are involved. An obvious implication of mey = +  is  1 dy de =−  for 
constant m, which is, of course, inconsistent with properties (Y) that requires  0 e Y > . 
It is not our intention to join in the chorus of those who declare all pieces of research in envi-
ronmental economics fundamentally flawed that are found guilty of not properly regarding the 
materials-balance principle. We rather aim at answering the intriguing question whether, and 
if so how, the production activity (1) can be reconciled with the materials-balance principle. 
We will show that (1) can be reconstructed, indeed, as part of a comprehensive production-
cum-abatement technology that is in line with the materials-balance principle. 
                                                 
4 The only theoretical inquiry into that issue we are aware of is offered in Siebert et al. (1980). Yet these authors 
fail to fully account for the materials-balance principle which is why their approach is of limited relevance for 
our subsequent analysis.   4
Maintaining the standard technological assumptions of concavity, non-linearity,
5 and smooth 
factor substitution, the proper regard of materials-balance requirements will make it necessary 
to also account for residuals other than the production residuals represented by the variable e 
in (1). We will also demonstrate that these additional interdependent residuals do not render 
incorrect the conventional analysis of pollution control based on (1) if and only if their emis-
sion doesn't contribute to environmental degradation. Insofar we provide a rigorous rationale 
and justification for conventional model building. However, if the emitted production residu-
als, e, are not the only pollutants, the conditions determining allocative efficiency will be 
shown to differ markedly from those derived in conventional analysis. In that case, the con-
ventional marginal cost of abating production residuals,  e Y , will turn out to deviate from the 
social marginal cost of abating these residuals because we deal with a pollution problem in-
volving multiple and interdependent pollutants. This finding will be shown to have non-trivial 
implications for efficiency-restoring tax schemes. 
Section 2 introduces a comprehensive technology of production and residuals abatement 
based on the materials-balance principle, and we will rigorously derive the production func-
tion (1) as a proper though incomplete technological subsystem of the comprehensive produc-
tion-cum-abatement technology. Moreover, the entire comprehensive production-cum-
abatement technology will be shown to be completely represented by (1) and two further pro-
duction functions mapping the domain of (1) into the abatement residuals. In Section 3 we 
will incorporate the comprehensive production-cum-abatement technology developed in Sec-
tion 2 into a simple economy subject to pollution, and we will derive the pertaining rules for 
an efficient allocation. If residuals other than (unabated) production residuals also cause pol-
lution, the optimality rules become complex, since all these pollutants are generated in strict 
technological interdependence. Section 4 explores the consequences of that interdependence 
for the design of efficiency-restoring tax schemes. Taking the conventional Pigouvian tax rule 
as a benchmark we show that if residuals other than production residuals contribute to pollu-
tion in addition to the latter, it is not efficient, in general, to set the tax on production residuals 
equal to the conventional marginal abatement cost,  e Y . 
 
 
                                                 
5  Ayres and Kneese (1969) developed their 'materials balance approach' in a model with strictly linear produc-
tion processes. That makes it quite easy to keep track of material balance but fails to account for realistic substi-
tution and transformation possibilities. See also Pethig (2003).   5
2. Abatement and production in line with materials balance 
Suppose during the process of producing a consumer good a production residual is generated 
with each unit equal to one unit of weight. This residual is assumed to be an unwanted prod-
uct, useless for consumptive and productive purposes, and harmful if discharged into the envi-
ronment. It is therefore a candidate for abatement. Although it is quite common to equate 
abatement with disappearance into the void, abatement is clearly an activity of combining 
scarce inputs, both material inputs and services, for the purpose of transforming the residuals 
under consideration into outputs with different physical and/or chemical attributes. Abatement 
does "not destroy the residuals but only alters their form" (Ayres and Kneese 1969, 283). 
To formalize such an abatement activity in a very simple way, let a be the amount of the pro-
duction residuals to be abated. Technically speaking, a is an input in the transformation proc-
ess to be described and needs to be combined with other inputs to make the transformation 
work. Suppose two other inputs are necessary: a service, called labor,  a A , and a physical in-
put, called material,  a m . With these 'ingredients', the aim of abatement is to use labor for 
transforming both material inputs, a and  a m , into two distinct kinds of material residuals de-
noted abatement residuals, which are assumed to differ from production residuals, a, and ma-
terial,  a m , in some significant way. But it is also obvious that with given positive amounts  a A  
and  a m  one cannot transform arbitrarily large amounts of production residuals into abatement 
residuals. In fact, we assume that there is a technology  ( ) → Aaa A: ,m a such that the amount 
() aa A ,m A  of the production residual can be abated when labor input is  a A  and material input 
is  a m . We assume the function A to have the 
Properties (A):  
2 : A ++ → \\  is concave and satisfies  ( )( ) 00 0 aa A, m A , = = A ,  
                           0 A > A ,   0 m A > ,  0 A < AA ,  0 mm A <  and  0 m A > A . 
0 A > A  and  0 m A >  implies that  a A  and  a m  can be substituted against each other when a 
given amount of production residuals is to be abated. To sum up, ( ) aa a, ,m A  is considered a 
feasible abatement activity, if  () aa A, m a = A . 
The next step is to specify the generation of abatement residuals. How exactly and in which 
amounts abatement residuals are generated is an engineering issue that will not be pursued 
here. For expository purposes we will consider here the very simple case where all 'abated' 
production residuals are turned into one kind of abatement residuals, called abatement residu-  6
als of type 1, and where all material input used in the process of abatement is turned into an-
other kind of abatement residuals, called abatement residuals of type 2. Denoting the amounts 
of abatement residuals by 
1 a r  and 
2 a r , respectively, our simple technological assignment is 
1 a ar =  and 
2 aa mr = . 
The technology of producing consumer goods is introduced in form of the production function 
   () yy yF , m = A , 
where  y A  denotes labor input,  y m  denotes material input and y is the amount of consumer 
good produced.  
Properties (F):  
2 : F ++ → \\  is concave and satisfies  ( )( ) 00 0 yy F, m F , = = A , 
                           0 F > A ,  ] [ 01 m F, ∈ ,  0 F < AA   0 mm F <  and  0 m F > A .
6 
The constraint  ] [ 01 m F, ∈  is absent from conventional production functions and therefore 
demands an explanation. Our simple production model assumes that there is one and only one 
material input whose quantity  y m  is transformed into at least two different outputs, the con-
sumer good (quantity y) and some production residuals (specified below), since the entropy 
law prevents the full transformation of material into the desired output. Since we conceive of 
y as a material output whose units are of constant weight, it follows immediately that  
   () 1
y, y m m F <
A    for  y m  = 0   and  0 y ≥ A . 
When this property of F is combined with the (conventional) assumption  0 mm F < , we con-
clude that  1 m F <  holds on the entire domain of the function F.
7 
From the preceding discussion it is obvious that  ( ) yy yF , m = A  is not a complete description 
of the production technology. After all, F allows us to maintain some level (and weight) of 
output y while varying the amount of material input. A minimum requirement for satisfying 
                                                 
6 Note that the materials-balance principle also implies  ( ) 0 ,
y
yy y y F md m λλ ∫ ≤
A
A  for all  0 y m ≥ , since the output 
is made up of material  y m  only and the weight per unit of output y is constant. This constraint is compatible 







7 The upper bound  1 m F <  is usually absent in textbook treatments of production functions, and it is violated, in 
particular, by the popular Cobb-Douglas function.   7
the materials-balance principle is the existence of at least one more output, say a production 
residual  y r , to fill the materials-balance gap: 
   () yy y y rF m , m += A   (and  0 y r ≥ ). 
In other words, bringing the conventional non-linear production function  () yy yF , m = A  in 
line with the materials-balance principle requires to look at production as transforming the 
material input,  y m , into two distinct outputs: the consumer good, y, whose generation is the 
purpose of the activity, and some production residuals, considered unwanted and environmen-
tally harmful. From  () yy y y rmF m , =− A  follows ( ) /1 yy m dr dm F = −  which is positive due to 
the assumption  ] [ 01 m F , ∈ .  
At this point, production and abatement need to be linked up. Without any abatement, the 
total amount of production residuals generated,  ( ) yy y y rmF m , =− A , would be discharged 
into the environment. But one can also hold back part of the production residuals from dis-
charging, say the amount a, for abatement such that only the amount  0 y er a = −≥. 
To sum up, the combined technologies of production and abatement are given by 
() yy yF , m ≤ A   ( 2 a )          ay + = AAA             ( 2 e )  
yy rmy =−    ( 2 b )          ay mmm + =              ( 2 f )  
() aa aA , m ≤ A     ( 2 c )         
1 a ra =              ( 2 g )  
y er a =−      ( 2 d )         
2 aa rm =              ( 2 h )  
The properties (A) and (F) are satisfied                   ( 2 i )  
As discussed in the introduction, environmental economists have always been serious about 
joint production of wanted and unwanted outputs, about environmental damage caused by the 
emission of the latter and about residuals abatement to reduce emissions. But rather than fo-
cusing on comprehensive production-cum-abatement technologies such as (2), many of them 
used to employ production functions of type (1), i. e. the functional form  () yY e , , m = A , 
where y, e, A and m are defined in the same way as in (2). 
The comparison between (1) and (2) readily confirms that if the production function of type 
(1) is at all compatible with the production-cum-abatement technology (2) it is an incomplete   8
description of that technology (2). The intriguing question is, therefore, what the precise rela-
tionship is between (1) and (2).
8 Can a function of type (1) with property (Y) be shown to be 
implied by (2) or is (1) incompatible with (2)? In the latter case, one would need to discard the 
technology (1) since the materials-balance principle cannot be dispensed with.  
To see what the link between (1) and (2) is like we now scrutinize the comprehensive tech-
nology (2) to elicit its major properties in several steps. 
Proposition 1:  
(i) Define    () ( ) { }
4    : y,e, ,m z z v for z y,e, ,m and v ϒ= ∈ = = ∈ Ω A\ A ,  where  ( ) zv 
is the component z of vector  ( )
12 ay a y a ay va , e , , , , m , m , m , r , r , r , y = AA A
12
+ ∈\  and where  
{ } 22 : v v satisfies ( a) ( i) Ω= − . The set ϒ  is convex.
9 
(ii)  If (2a) and (2b) hold as equalities there is a mapping  ( ) G: e, ,m y → A  implied by the 
production system (2) whose image is set valued. 
To establish proposition 1(i), it suffices to prove convexity of the set Ω, since if Ω is con-
vex, its projection ϒ  into the subspace of all vectors ( ) y,e, ,m A  is convex, too. Consider 
[ ] 01 , α ∈ ,  ( )
12 1 v: v v
α αα =+ −  and  ( )
2 i
ii i i i i i i i i i i i
ay a y aay v : a ,e , , , ,m ,m ,m ,r ,r ,r ,y = AA A  for i = 
1, 2. By definition, Ω is convex if for any pair 
12 v, v∈Ω it is true that v
α ∈Ω for all 
[ ] 01 , α ∈ . Hence we need to show that (2a) - (2i) is satisfied for v
α . Consider  yy r, m, y
α αα  and 
confirm that these variables satisfy (2b) by calculating 
y my
α α −  =  () ( )
12 1 2 11 yy mm yy αα α α +− − −− ( ) () ()
11 22 1 yy my my αα = −+ − −=  
=  ()
12 1 yy rr αα +−   y r
α =  
Quite obviously, the same procedure can be applied to all linear equations in (2). It therefore 
only remains to show that (2a) and (2c) are satisfied for v
α . This is easily established by ob-
serving that  () ( ) () ( )
12 1 1 2 2 11 yy yy yy yF , m F , m
α αα α α =+ − ≤ + − AA   () yy F, m
α α ≤ A , where the 
last inequality is due to the assumption that F is a concave function. Since the function A is 
also assumed concave, convexity of Ω is proved. 
                                                 
8  An early discussion on the relationship between technological concepts similar to (1) and (2) can be found in 
Siebert et al. (1980), where the technology of type (1) is referred to as net-emissions approach and that of type 
(2) as gross-emissions approach. Yet the technological concepts employed in Siebert et al. (1980) are not in line 
with the materials-balance principle. See also Pethig (2003). 
9  The sets Ω  and ϒ are also closed since (2) doesn't contain inequalities excluding the equality sign.   9
We now turn to proving proposition 1(ii). Let (2a) and (2c) hold as equalities and consider 
(2a), (2c) and (2d) - (2f) to turn (2b) into  ( )( ) yy y y y me A , m m F, m =+ − − + AA A . Total dif-






mm mm mm mm
A AA F
dm de d d dm
AF AF AF AF
−
=+− +
+− +− +− +−
AA A AA .          (3) 
Next we set  0 de d dm == = A  in (4), totally differentiate (2a) and (2c) to obtain, under con-
















A AA ,                 ( 4 a )  







da A d A dm d
AF
+−
=− − =− <
+−
AA








FA F A dy








.                       ( 4 c )  
Since  ] [ 01 m F, ∈  and  0 m A >  by assumption we have 1 0 mm AF + −> . However, the numera-
tor on the right side of (4a) may attain either sign so that y may increase or decrease by shift-
ing inputs from production, () yy ,m A , to abatement, ( ) aa ,m A , while leaving net emissions e 
unchanged. Equation (4c) demonstrates that for given ( ) e, ,m A  shifting the inputs labor and 
material between production and abatement affects both the amount of production residuals 
abated and the amount of consumer goods produced. The sign of dy/da in (4c) is unclear. 
The message of proposition 1(i) is that if there is a function of type (1) implied by (2) it will 
be concave. Unfortunately, proposition 1(ii) informs us that there is a correspondence rather 
than a function. Yet this lack of uniqueness can be overcome in a natural way since we are 
interested, of course, in the level of abatement which, for any given () e, ,m A , yields the 
maximum possible amount of the wanted output. That particular level of abatement will be 
called efficient. To characterize the efficient abatement we maximize with respect to a,  a A , 
y A ,  a m ,  y m  and  y r   the wanted output  ( ) yy F, m A  subject to (2b) – (2f). The associated La-
grangean reads  
() () yy y a a a e y
ay m a y




⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ − + − + ++− ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ +− − + − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ A
AA
AA A
   10
where  y λ ,  a λ ,  e λ ,  λA  and  m λ  are Lagrangean multipliers. Since the objective function is 
linear and all terms in the cornered brackets are concave functions the Kuhn-Tucker condi-







A  as well as  AF > AA .                         ( 5 )  
Note that (5) also follows from setting  0 dy / da =  in (5c).  AF > AA  follows from rearranging 
the equation in (5):  ( ) ( ) 10 mm m FA FF A F +− = −> AA A . 
With the concept of efficient abatement we now continue our inquiry into the relationship 
between the production system (2) and the production function (1). 
Proposition 2: If abatement is efficient, the production-cum-abatement technology (2) implies 
a production function Y:D + → \  that exhibits the properties (Y*) defined as 
(a)    Y exhibits the properties (Y), 
(b)   Y  satisfies  ] [ 0 mm Y, F ∈   [where  ] [ 01 m F, ∈  due to properties (F)], 
(c)   The domain of Y is  () ( ) { }
3 :, , , De m e m F m + =≤ − ⊂ AA \ ; 
Proposition 2 will now be proved in six steps. 
Step 1:  If abatement is efficient, the set of equations (2a) – (2f) implies a function 
() y M :e ,, m m → A  such that
10 
   () y mM e , , m
+++
= A .                                 ( 6 )  
Rewrite (5a) as  () 1 mm FAA F += AA , totally differentiate this equation and combine the result 
with  ay dd d =+ AA A  and  ay dm dm dm =+ from (2e) and (2f). After some rearrangements, 










AA ,                           ( 7 )  
where  ( ) 10
y mm m m :A F F A A F F A γ =+− + −> AA A A A A A A A , 0 mm :F A F A γ = −> AA A A A , 
  ( ) 10
y m m m m mm mm m :F A A F F A A F γ =+ + −−> AA A A   and   0 mm m m m :F A F A γ = −> AA . 
                                                 
10  A plus or minus sign underneath an argument of a function indicates the (assumed) sign of the corresponding 
first partial derivative.   11







ym m m y
AF
























dm de d dm
π π
πππ
=++ A A ,                           ( 8 )  
where  () ( ) 1 10
yy mm m m AF AF πγ γ = + −+ −> AA A ,  () 0
y mm m m AA F πγ γ = +− > AA A   
and   () ( ) ( ) 10
y mm m AA F A F A F A F A πγ γ γ ⎡⎤ =− −= ++ − + > ⎣⎦ AA A A A A A A A A A A A A. 
Obviously, equation (8) determines the first derivatives of a function  () y M :e ,, m m → A . 
Hence (6) is established. 
Step 2:  If abatement is efficient, the set of equations  (2a) – (2f) implies a function 





= AA .                                 ( 9 )  






dd e d d m
γ ρ ρ
πππ
=++ A AA ,                       ( 1 0 )  
where   () 10
y mm m :A F A ργ γ =+ − + > AA A   and   ( ) ( ) 11 mm mm m m m m :F A F A F A ργ ⎡ ⎤ =− − + − ⎣ ⎦ AA . 




= AA . 
Step 3: The preceding steps 1 and 2 imply a production function  ( ) Y: e , ,m y → A  satisfying 
00 e Y, Y >> A  and  ] [ 0 mm Y, F ∈ . 
Invoking (6) and (9) the production function (2a) is turned into 
   () ()( ).
?
y FLe ,, m, Me ,, m : Ye ,, m
++ +++
== ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ AA A                  ( 1 1 )  
The function Y defined above obviously exhibits  0 e Y >  and  0 Y > A  but the sign of 
mm m m YF LF M =+ A                            ( 1 2 )    12
is unclear. To prove  ] [ 0 mm Y, F ∈ , let (2a) and (2c) hold as equalities and combine the equa-
tions (2a) – (2f), (6) and (9) to rewrite (2b) as 
() () ( ) ( )() ,, , ,, ,, , ,, ,, e A Le m m Me m FLe m Me m Me m ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ +− − + = ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ AA A A A A . 
We differentiate this equation with respect to m (keeping e and A constant): 
   () 1 mm m mm m m AL A M FL FM M −+−++ = AA  
which yields, after rearrangement of terms, 









Next we substitute this term for  m L  in (11) and get 
() 1 mm m
mm m m m m
FA F AF
YF LF M F M
AF AF
⎡⎤ +−











since owing to (5) the term in the cornered brackets is zero. Moreover,  , and m AA F AA  are 





















Step 4: The production function Y from (11) is concave. 
In view of the complex terms constituting its first derivatives there is no way to further spec-
ify its curvature by determining the sign of its second-order derivatives. Yet concavity of Y is 
straightforward from the convexity of the set ϒ  that was established in proposition 1(i).  
Step 5: The domain of the production function Y 
We now determine the domain D of function Y by observing that (3) yields  










= − AA A
 > 0 
for given A and m. That implies, in turn, 
( ) ( ) ( )() ()
,
max , , 0, 0 , ,
yy
yy y y y
m
mA m m F m m A Fmm Fm ⎡⎤ −− −− = − − = − ⎣⎦ A
AA A A A . 
Consequently, for given inputs A and m the amount of production residuals emitted is largest 
when no abatement takes place at all. As an implication, the domain of Y from (11) is D as   13
defined above. The upper bound which is placed on e in D is due to the fact that e is an output 
and the law of mass conservation doesn't allow for an arbitrary expansion of a material output 
in a production process with a limited (finite) amount of material input. This completes the 
proof of proposition 2. 
Proposition 2 constitutes an important step toward reconciling the use of the production func-
tion (1) with material-balance requirements. It shows (i) that if efficient abatement is presup-
posed, the output of the consumer good is uniquely determined by ( ) e, ,m A  and (ii) that the 
implied production function satisfies the properties (Y) since it satisfies the properties (Y*). 
Thus we confirmed that the properties (Y) are necessary for any production function to be 
compatible with the technology (2). We also showed, however, that (2) imposes further con-
straints on the function Y from (11) concerning its domain and the derivative  m Y . Both these 
additional restrictions can be easily violated if production functions Y of type (1) are em-
ployed that exhibit the properties (Y) only. In particular,  ] [ 0 mm Y, F ∈  implies that popular 
parametric production functions such as Cobb-Douglas functions don’t qualify for represent-
ing technologies of type (2). 
In proposition 2 we didn't account for the residuals resulting from the abatement process. 
Now we make up for this omission in 
Proposition 3:  
(i)  Provided that the abatement activity is always kept at an efficient level, the produc-
tion-cum-abatement technology (2) is equivalent to three functions 
12 ,, Y R and R  that 
map  () ∈ A e, ,m D  into  () ( ) ( )
12 Ye ,, m, R e ,, ma n d R e ,, m AA A ,  where D and Y are 
specified as in proposition 2, and where 
() () ( )
1
1 0 a r R e, ,m : A L e, ,m ,m M e, ,m ⎡⎤ == − −≥ ⎣⎦ AA A A ,               ( 1 3 )  
() ()()
2
21 0 a r R e ,, m:TR e ,, m, Le ,, m ⎡⎤ == − ≥ ⎣⎦ AA A A ,  and             ( 1 4 )  
() aa T: a , m → A  is a function such that  ( ) aa mT a , = A , if and only if  () aa aA , m = A . 
(ii) The  functions 
1 R  and 
2 R are concave. Its derivatives are indeterminate in sign except 
for 
1 0 < e R  and 
2 0 < e R .   14
First we specify the functions 
1 R  and 
2 R  from (13) and (14), respectively. As for the abate-
ment residuals of type 1, we combine (2c), (2e) - (2g), (8) and (10) to obtain (13). Since 
2 aa rm =  due to (2h), we obtain  ( ) aa rT a , = A  (with T as defined in proposition 3(i)). When 
combined with (9), (13), (2e) and (2g), this equation  yields (14). Concavity of the functions 
1 R  and 
2 R  follows immediately from the convexity of the set Ω established in the proof of 
proposition 1(i). 
To see how the generation of abatement residuals reacts on the emission of production residu-
als we take the partial derivatives 
()
1
ee m e R AL AM =− + A    and    ( )
2
ea m e a e e R TAM TA T L M ⎡⎤ =− + + =− ⎣⎦ AA . 
While 
1 0 e R <  is obvious, 
2 0 ee RM =− <  is explained by observing that total differentiation of 







=− A A  and that in view of the definition of function T 
above we clearly have  () 1 am TA =  and  ( ) m TA A =− AA . The signs of the partial derivatives 
1
e R  and 
2
e R  are as expected: If the scale of abatement is stepped up (such that the emissions e 
are reduced) more abatement residuals are generated and vice versa. Checking the remaining 
partial derivatives of (13) and (14) reveals that their sign is ambiguous. This indeterminacy 
demonstrates that the impact of A and m on 
1 a r  and 
2 a r  is quite complex in spite of the simple 
hypotheses (2g) and (2h). 
In view of the propositions 2 and 3 the technology (2) is completely and compactly described 
by  
   () ()
1
1 == AA a yY e , , m , r Re , , m   and   ( )
2
2 = A a rR e , , m .              ( 1 5 )  
where Y, 
1 R  and 
2 R  are as defined in (11), (13) and (14), respectively. In proposition 2 the 
function Y from (11) has been shown to satisfy properties (Y*) while the curvature of 
1 R  and 
2 R  is less well known (proposition 3(ii)). With proposition (2) our main goal is clearly 
achieved, namely to show that the properties (Y) are necessary conditions for functions (1) to 
represent a subsystem of the comprehensive technology (2). In proposition (2) we even 
proved that the properties (Y) are not sufficient since the properties (Y*) are more restrictive 
than the properties (Y).    15
Yet the characterization of the relationship between (1) and (2) is still incomplete from a theo-
retical point of view. One may want to know which the comprehensive set of conditions is 
that must be satisfied by the functions Y, 
1 R  and 
2 R  from (15) to secure that these functions 
are equivalent to some technology (2). Unfortunately there is little hope to make progress to-
ward this end because the properties of Y, 
1 R  and 
2 R  from (15) are made up of a complex 
mix of first and higher-order derivatives of the functions A and F from (2). The basic produc-
tion functions A and F determine the curvature of Y, 
1 R  and 
2 R  in a very complex and inter-
dependent way involving a constrained maximization procedure (efficient abatement).  
It is true that without a complete set of conditions we cannot decide whether a given conven-
tional production function (1) is compatible with the comprehensive technology (2) or not. 
Yet the value of such a result is not so clear. The information provided in propositions 2 and 3 
appears to be sufficient for most theoretical modeling exercises, since in those studies first 
and higher-order derivatives are usually not quantitatively (let alone numerically) specified. 
For applied research, it is hardly appropriate to start out with some ‘arbitrary’ function Y satis-
fying the properties (Y*). One would rather have to start with the empirically valid specifica-
tion of the true technology (2) anyway, since (11), (13) and (14) are and always will be de-
rived from the true empirically observable technology (2). 
 
3. Allocative efficiency and materials balance in an economy with production, abate-
ment and pollution 
We now envisage a simple economy where an (aggregate) firm applies technology (2). The 
consumption of the only wanted output y is modeled as a process of material transformation 
like production and abatement: it consists in turning the amount y of the consumer good into 
the amount  c r  of a post-consumption residual. Both are equal in weight, 
   c yr = .                                ( 1 6 )  
Thus we now deal with four different types of residuals:  12 aa e,r ,r  and  c r , each of which has 
the potential to degrade the environment after having been discharged. Denote by x an index 
of the ambient concentration of pollutants, called pollution for short. We define 
   () 12
000 +≥ ≥ ≥
= aac x X e,r ,r ,r     with  X (0, 0, 0, 0) =  0                   ( 1 7 )    16
as the pollution that results from releasing the residuals  12 aa e,r ,r  and  c r  into the environment. 
X is assumed to be non-decreasing and convex. If  0 v X =  for  12 or aa c vr , r ,r =  the level of the 
residual under consideration is small enough to be fully neutralized by nature's  assimilative 
capacity. Environmental degradation as described by x negatively affects the consumers' util-
ity 
   ()
i
ii uU x , y
−+
=    i = 1, …, n.                        ( 1 8 )  
The general equilibrium model is completed by introducing the standard resource constraints 
   i i yy ≥∑ ,      ≥ AA      and     mm ≥ ,                      ( 1 9 )  
where  A and m  are the economy's fixed factor endowments. To characterize a Pareto effi-
cient allocation of the economy (15) - (19) we solve the Lagrangean 
  () () ( ) 12
i
ii f x a a c i Ux , y Y e , , m y xX e , r , r , r αλ λ ⎡ ⎤ +− + − + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∑ A ()
1
11 a rR e , , m λ ⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦ A  + 
()()
2
22 ay i i rR e , , m y y λλ ⎡⎤ +− + −+ ⎣⎦ ∑ A ( ) ( ) ( ) cc m ry m m λλ λ − +− + − A AA ,         (20) 
where  i α  are arbitrary positive numbers for i = 1, …, n. Under the assumption that an inte-
rior
11 solution exists the first-order conditions are 
  
i
yi y U λα =   i = 1, …, n     ( 2 1 a )          yfc λ λλ = +         ( 2 1 f )  
  
i
x ix i U λα =−∑        (21b)        
c cx r X λ λ =        (21g) 
  
j
f ex e j e j YX R λλ λ =+ ∑     ( 2 1 c )         
1 1 a x r X λ λ =      (21h) 
  
j
fj j YR λλ λ =+ ∑ AA A      (21d)        
2 2 a x r X λ λ =       (21k) 
  
j
f mm j m j YR λλ λ =+ ∑      (21e) 




































.          (22) 
As a consequence, 
                                                 
11  In the present context, an interior solution implies that ( ) e, ,m A  is in the interior of the domain D of function 
Y. This doesn't only require all variables to be bounded away from zero but also that the inequality 
() emF, m ≤− A  is not binding. For the sake of completeness one would have had to consider this inequality as 
an additional constraint in (20). But with the strict inequality sign in the solution the associated Lagrange multi-
plier would be zero and therefore need not be introduced in the first place.   17
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  from (21c), (21h) and (21k). (22) is then obtained by inserting 
this equation into (24). 
Clearly, (22) characterizes the efficient level of pollution generated jointly via the emission of 
all residuals.  x MD  is the damage from a marginal increase in pollution evaluated by the con-
sumers' aggregate marginal willingness-to-pay in terms of the consumer good for avoiding 
that increase. The right side of (22) represents the marginal benefit of pollution that comes in 
form of an increase in the consumer good made possible by a small increase in pollution 
through stepping up emissions. Equivalently, one can interpret  x MD  as the marginal benefit 
and  ee YQ X  as the marginal cost of reducing pollution. To further interpret the term  ee YQ X  
observe that  e Y  is the amount of consumer goods that cannot be produced anymore when the 
emission of production residuals is reduced by a small amount. It is known as marginal 
abatement costs of production residuals (in terms of the consumer good) in models where no 
residuals other than production residuals are considered. For convenience, we will refer to  e Y  
as conventional marginal abatement costs of production residuals. 
If we multiply both sides of (22) by  e X  we obtain  xe e MDX YQ ⋅ =⋅. The left side of this 
equation represents the marginal benefit of reducing the emission of production residuals and   18
the right side consists of the marginal abatement costs of production residuals. Those costs 
differ from  e Y  unless Q = 1. In fact, inspection of the definition of Q in (22) reveals that 
given 0 e X >  (which we presuppose throughout) Q may be greater or smaller than unity de-
pending on which other residuals contribute to pollution. More specifically, the optimality 
condition  xe e MDX YQ ⋅= ⋅  and the definition of Q from (22) imply (23). 
The striking result is that  e Y , the conventional marginal abatement cost of production residu-
als, is an incorrect measure of the social marginal abatement costs of production residuals, in 
general, when in addition to production residuals other residuals contribute to pollution, too.
12 
As shown in (23), if abatement residuals are pollutants in addition to production residuals but 
post-consumption residuals are not,  e Y  underestimates the true marginal abatement costs of 
production residuals. This is so because the abatement of production residuals generates a 
negative pollution externality through the increase of abatement residuals which it unavoid-
ably brings about but which is not accounted for in  e Y . Conversely, if post-consumption re-
siduals pollute in addition to production residuals but abatement residuals don't, we infer from 
(23) that  e Y  overestimates the (true) marginal abatement costs of production residuals since 
this time abatement induces a positive externality in form of a small reduction in pollution 
caused by post-consumption residuals which is not captured by  e Y . 
 
4. Corrective taxes in the competitive market economy 
Consider now the economy of Section 3 with perfectly competitive markets for labor, material 
and the consumer good and denote the associated prices by  m p ,p A  and  y p , respectively. 
Quite obviously, such a market economy fails to be efficient in the absence of environmental 
policy. We are therefore interested in exploring what kind of tax schemes is capable to restore 
efficiency. As is well-known, if we would replace in our model (15) by (1) and replace (17) 
by  () x Xe =  with  0 e X > , the pollution externality would be internalized by the time-
honored Pigouvian tax rule according to which the tax rate  e t  on emissions e is to be set equal 
to the conventional marginal abatement cost,  e Y . But in our model with the comprehensive 
production-cum-abatement technology (2) it is also interesting to investigate the deviations 
                                                 
12  The added term 'in general' weakens that statement slightly. Yet it is necessary since marginal pollution ef-
fects of abatement residuals and post-consumption residuals are opposite in sign. It cannot be excluded, there-
fore, that both effects compensate each other incidently.   19
from that conventional Pigouvian tax rule required in a model containing (15) and (17) and 
when  12 ra ra X ,X  and/or  rc X  are positive. 
To address this issue we need to look at the agents' optimization problems as implicitly de-
scribed by the Lagrangeans
13 
   () ( )
i
ii i m i i y Ux , y p p m gb p y µθ ⎡⎤ ++ + + − ⎣⎦ AA   and                (25) 
   () () { } ( ) 11 22 ym m a a a a c c e c c p ypt pt m t rt rt r t e ry µ −+ −+ − − −−+ − + AA A  
   () () ()
12
11 22 fa a Y e, ,m y r R e, ,m r R e, ,m µµ µ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ +− + − + − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ AA A .         (26) 
With regard to post-consumption residuals, implicit in (25) and (26) is the so-called take-back 
rule as modeled, e. g., in Eichner and Pethig (2000). Each consumer i purchases the amount 
i y  of consumer goods, and after consumption she returns the post-consumption residuals to 
the producers. By institutional design, producers are responsible for the (orderly) deposition 
of these residuals, and they may be therefore charged an emission fee,  c t , if the post-
consumption residuals cause pollution after having been emitted. This institutional arrange-
ment explains why post-consumption residuals don't enter the consumers' optimization calcu-
lus (25),
14 but rather are part of the (aggregate) firm's profit maximization calculus. 
The (aggregate) firm employs the technology (15) and is charged input taxes, tA  and  m t , as 
well as emission taxes,  12 ea a t, t , t  and  c t . Some of these tax rates may be zero, of course. The 
first-order conditions associated to an (interior) solution to (25) and (26) are conveniently 
summarized in 
i
iy y p U µ = ,         ( 2 7 a )      ( )
j
yc a j j pt Ypt t R −= + + ∑ AA A A ,     (27c) 
()
j
yc ee a j e j pt Yt t R −= + ∑ ,  (27b)     ( )
j
yc m mm a j m j pt Y pt t R −= + + ∑ .   (27d) 
Proposition 4: 
                                                 
13  For v = A, m, consumer i's factor endowment is  i v  with  i i vv = ∑ .  i θ  is her share in the firm's profit, g, and 
the government's budget surplus, b. The consumers' profit and surplus shares satisfy  1 j jθ = ∑ . 
14  One can easily account for that alternative by modifying (25) and (26) in the following way: In (25), add the 
term "
i cc tr − " to the second expression in brackets and add the Lagrange constraint " ()
ii i cc c i rr y λ − " at the end. 
In (26), delete the term " cc tr − " and the Lagrange constraint " ( )
i cc ry µ − ". In the absence of institution-specific 
costs the conditions for allocative efficiency are the same in both regimes (Eichner and Pethig 2000).   20
(i) Suppose, that  12cf mx ,,,,,, λ λλλλλλ A  and  y λ  are the values attained by the Lagrange 
multipliers in the solution to (20) and that the partial derivatives  e X  and 
j
h R  for j = 1, 2 and 
h, m = A  are also evaluated at that solution. Set prices  mm yy p, p , p λ λλ = == AA  and con-
sider the alternative tax schemes A and B: 
- A is defined by:     1122
AA AA
aa c c e x e t, t , t, tX λλλλ ====   and   0
AA
m tt = = A ; 
- B is defined by:     12 0  
BB B B j B j
aa c c e x e j e j e jj t t ,t ,t X R,t R a n d λλ λ λ == = = + = ∑∑ A   
   
B j
mj m j tR λ =∑ . 
With these prices and either tax scheme A or tax scheme B all markets clear and the equilib-
rium allocation is efficient. 
(ii)  When the tax scheme A is implemented, the efficient tax rates satisfy 
   { }
A
ee tY >




0  and/or   0  and  0,
0











⎪ ⎪ == = ⎨
⎪ == ⎪ ⎩
             ( 2 8 )  
To prove Proposition 4i insert the prices and tax rates as assigned in Proposition 4 into (27) 
and verify that this substitution makes (27) coincide with (21). The tax scheme A in Proposi-
tion 4i is a pure emissions tax scheme in the sense that a tax is levied on the emission of each 
polluting residual, while non-emission items like the inputs labor and material are not taxed. 
We infer from (21) that (in equilibrium) with the tax scheme A all tax rates are set equal to the 








tM D X :
U
== − ∑  for 
12 aa v e,r ,r ,c =                   ( 2 9 )  
We also know that if abatement takes place, optimal emissions tax rates need to equal mar-
ginal abatement costs. In our model production residuals are the only residuals subject to 
abatement. Therefore we will now focus on those residuals. Invoking (27b) we obtain, after 
some rearrangement of terms, 
   =− − ∑
AA j A
ee a j e c e j tY t R t Y .                          ( 3 0 )  
                                                 
15  To simplify the comparison of marginal conditions characterizing either efficient allocations or market alloca-
tions we measure all prices and tax rates in terms of the consumer good by setting  1 y p ≡ .   21
Maintaining the assumption  0 e X >  (which implies  0
A
e t >  owing to (29)) we now wish to 
juxtapose alternative scenarios where one, two or all of the (efficient!) tax rates  12
A A
aa t, t and 
A
c t  may be zero. In view of 
1 00 ee Y, R ><  and 
2 0 e R < , it is straightforward that (29) and (30) 
imply (28). (28) complements (24), in fact, but (28) was derived via (30) rather than via (23) 
and thus offers insights in the determinants of the efficient emissions tax rate  e t . 
Suppose first, pollution is caused by the emission of production residuals only 
() 12 0 ra ra rc XXX == = . Then  ee tY =  is optimal due to (28), i. e. the tax rate  e t  is required to 
be set equal to the conventional marginal costs of abating production residuals. When com-









−= = ∑                            ( 3 1 )  
which constitutes the conventional Pigouvian tax rule. Yet in view of possible deviations 
from that rule, as described in (29) and (31), (31) is not a trivial result because we specified 
conditions under which the conventional Pigouvian tax rule is valid. 
Suppose next that 
1 0 >
a r X  and/or 
2 0 >
a r X  but  0
c r X = . In this case the social marginal 
abatement costs of production residuals are 
Aj
ea j e e j Yt R Y − > ∑ . The extra marginal costs, 
j
aj e jtR ∑ , accrue because an increase in the abatement of production residuals inadvertently 
raises the generation of environmentally harmful abatement residuals. The result 
A
ee tY >  is 
worth noting: It is now optimal to abate less production residuals than under the conventional 
Pigouvian tax rule. Conversely, if abatement residuals don't degrade the environment but 
post-consumption residuals do () 12 0 and  0 = =>
aa c rr r XX X , then the social marginal abate-
ment costs of production residuals are 
A
ec e e Yt YY − < . The extra marginal cost savings, 
A
ce tY, 
occur because an increase in the abatement of production residuals inadvertently reduces the 
amount of post-consumption residuals and consumer goods. Since post-consumption residuals 
are (now) pollutants by assumption, curbing  c r  reduces that pollution which is, in turn, a 
beneficial external effect of abating production residuals. With 
A
ee tY <  it is now optimal to 
abate more production residuals than under the conventional Pigouvian tax rule.   22
Despite our main focus on the discussion of (28) one needs to keep in mind that according to 
(29) the efficient tax scheme A requires to levy a tax on all polluting residuals. It doesn't fol-
low from setting 
A
ee tY ≠  as prescribed by (28) that no emissions tax other than  e t  is needed to 
achieve efficiency in case that the production residuals are not the only pollutants. For that 
scenario our analysis provides an important lesson: If all polluting residuals are taxed in an 
effort to correct for the allocative distortion, it is not efficient, in general, to set the tax rate of 
the production residuals equal to their marginal abatement cost, conventionally defined. 
Turning to the interpretation of tax scheme B we observe that B is also capable of restoring 
efficiency in the market economy and does so without any tax on abatement residuals. This 
scheme is a particularly interesting option for efficient pollution control if abatement residuals 
are difficult and costly to monitor and therefore cannot readily be used as a tax base. How-
ever, avoiding taxes on abatement residuals comes at the price of taxing labor and material (in 
addition to post-consumption and production residuals).
16 Since the signs of the derivatives 
j RA  and 
j
m R  for j = 1, 2 are ambiguous, it is not clear, whether  m t  and tA  are subsidies or 
taxes (proper). At any rate, securing efficiency by means of tax scheme B requires to drive tax 
wedges between demand prices and supply prices on all three markets. Taking a closer look at 
e t  under tax scheme B shows that 
   () aj
i
jB B x
er e e e c e ij i
y
U
X XR t Y t Y
U
−+ = = − ∑∑ .                    ( 3 2 )  
To the left of the first equality sign in (32) we have the sum of the direct (positive) and indi-
rect (negative) marginal benefits of a small reduction in the emission of production residuals. 
The indirect benefit is, in fact, the marginal environmental damage from the emission of 
abatement residuals caused by stepping up abatement. Correspondingly, the far right side of 
(32) represents the social marginal abatement cost which is the same as in tax scheme A for 
the case that  12 0 ra ra XX == . Since 
B
ee tY < , it is optimal to abate more production residuals 
than under the conventional Pigouvian tax rule. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
                                                 
16  One may wonder why there isn't a third efficiency restoring tax scheme, that taxes also labor and material 
(like B) but in which  e t  captures the impact of all kinds of residuals. After all, due to  c ry = , post-consumption 
residuals are generated uno actu with all other outputs. However, when we set  12 0 aac ttt = ==  in (26) there is 
no way to find values for  m t, t A  and  e t  such that market equilibria turn out to be efficient.   23
It is a standard procedure in environmental economics to model abatement as a non-linear 
technological process to reduce the discharge into the environment of a residual generated as 
a by-product of a wanted good. It is also standard in formal analyses of production-cum-
abatement to map incompletely the materials flow that is inevitably involved in that process. 
The present paper shows how the standard way of modeling production-cum-abatement can 
be brought into line with physical constraints securing materials balance. It demonstrates, in 
particular, that the production function (1) can be reconstructed from a comprehensive pro-
duction-cum-abatement technology. Although (1) maps the materials flow incompletely, a 
production function of type (1) has been shown to be implied by each technology (2) that 
fully accounts for all materials flows involved. We have also been proved that the implied 
function Y satisfies the properties (Y*) that are sufficient but not necessary for the properties 
(Y). It remains an open question, therefore, whether for each function Y satisfying the afore-
mentioned properties (Y*) there exists a technology (2) such that Y is implied by that technol-
ogy. Therefore we also don’t know the comprehensive set of conditions that makes the func-
tions Y, 
1 R  and 
2 R  from (15) fully compatible with the technology (2).  
 Moreover, in a simple general equilibrium model with full regard of the materials flow the 
paper explores the consequences for allocative efficiency and efficiency-restoring taxation of 
multiple interdependent pollutants that are inevitably linked to the transformation processes of 
production, abatement and consumption. Finally, the paper demonstrates that efficiency may 
require setting the emissions tax rate above or below conventionally defined marginal abate-
ment cost if the residual subject to abatement is not the only residual causing environmental 
degradation. 
Krysiak and Krysiak (2003) address the issue of modeling all processes of materials transfor-
mation consistently in an analytical framework that aims at maximum generality. We pro-
ceeded, instead, by trading generality for more specific and more informative results about the 
emergence and consequences of multiple and interdependent residuals and pollutants involved 
in production-cum-abatement when the materials-balance principle is explicitly and fully re-
garded. 
As for the consequences of multiple residuals, we find, not surprisingly, that if the production 
residual,  y r , is the only pollutant it suffices to employ the 'truncated' production-cum-
abatement technology (1). However, as soon as the emission of at least one additional residual 
in the pertaining materials flow also contributes to the degradation of the environment, the 
need for an integrated multi-pollutant control arises (Guruswanny 1991). There is a growing   24
awareness in both academia and the political arena (U.S. General Accounting Office 1996) 
that the most efficient control strategy is to consider multiple pollutants simultaneously rather 
than continue with the prevailing single-pollutant regulations. However, the demand for 
multi-pollutant control approaches is quite often rationalized by growing concerns about the 
potential risks to human health and/or to the environment from the interaction of multiple 
pollutants after their emission. These are certainly serious concerns in their own right. Yet the 
emphasis of the present paper is on allocative problems caused by multiple pollutants whose 
generation is interdependent. In that case, a first-best tax strategy also needs to account for 
the technical interdependencies among the residuals since such linkages impact on the effi-
cient levels of all tax rates. As a consequence, the time-honored rule of equating the emissions 
tax rate and marginal abatement cost, defined in the conventional way, is shown to be no 
longer efficient, in general. 
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